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Changing the Balance of Power:
Why a Treaty-trump Presumption
Should Replace the Later-in-time
Rule When Interpreting Conflicting
Treaties and Statutes
by SCOTT A. PENNER*
I. Introduction
In November 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States heard
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal in which
Petitioners, a small group, approximately 140 people, challenged the
Government's refusal to allow them the use of hallucinogens in their
ceremonial rituals.' During oral arguments, the Government relied on a
160-nation treaty to defend the ban on hallucinogens.2 The Court asked
Petitioner how the group could claim an entitlement to use hallucinogens in
the face of the international treaty. Justice Scalia came to counsel's rescue
when he helpfully chimed in: "Statutes trump treaties."3  Justice Scalia's
interjection is only partly true. While a statute enacted after a treaty's
ratification does trump the treaty, a treaty ratified after a statute's
enactment will trump the statute.4 This rule of interpretation, called the
later-in-time rule, was first adopted in 1884.'
* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; A.B. 2001,
Computer Science, Harvard University. I would like to thank my wonderful wife Rebecca
Rakow Penner for her patience and assistance throughout the writing and editorial process. I
would also like to thank the Volume 33 and Volume 34 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Editorial Boards for giving me the honor of publishing.
1. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, 0 Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (No. 04-1084), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_041084/argument/
3. Id. at 39.
4. Edye v. Roberston, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
5. Id.
[3551
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
This Note proposes a treaty-trump rule of statutory interpretation. In
the absence of clear congressional intent that the statute should overrule an
existing treaty, the treaty's provisions should control. Part II of this Note
describes the historical roots of the canons of treaty interpretation. Part III
explains why the later-in-time rule is an unconstitutional doctrine. Part IV
addresses the policy rationale for adopting the treaty-trump rule in the
twenty-first century: ensuring stability in international law as well as
accountability and transparency in the legislative process. Finally, Part V
discusses why transitioning to a treaty-trump rule will be relatively easy for
the courts and Congress to accomplish because it more accurately reflects
the actual practice of courts today. Because a treaty-trump rule more
closely comports with the Constitution than the patchwork of interpretive
techniques currently utilized by the judiciary, when courts are faced with a
conflicting statute and treaty, the treaty should prevail absent a clear and
explicit congressional determination that the statute should take priority.
II. Historical Roots of the Canons
of Treaty Interpretation
Abu Ghraib brought to the forefront of American discourse the
potential for torture and harm that can befall captives of war.6 Senators,
Representatives, and the media harped on what they perceived were blatant
violations of U.S. treaty obligations under the Geneva Convention.7 The
Fourth Geneva Convention, adopted in 1949 and entered into force in 1950,
prohibits the torture of every prisoner of war.8  This long-standing and
well-known prohibition continues to be a source of considerable debate and
discussion. Yet, Congress could pass a law that deals domestically with the
6. See, e.g., Darius Rejali, Viewpoint: The Real Shame of Abu Ghraib, TIME, May 20,
2004, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,640375,00.html.
7. See Steve Andreason, Beyond the Roots ofAbu Ghraib, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2004, at
A23 (encouraging Senators to "lay[] the foundation for a new [torture] policy, one that reaffirms
America's commitment to international agreements [the Geneva Convention] that remain relevant
in a dangerous world"); Countdown with Keith Olberman (MSNBC television broadcast June 8,
2004) (Democrat Senator Joe Biden responding to a question about the administration sanctioning
torture by stating "[t]here's a reason why we sign these treaties, to protect my son in the military.
That's why we have these treaties, so when Americans are captured, they are not tortured");
Father Blames Bush, Rumsfeld for Son's Death, N.Z. HERALD, May 15, 2004, at B16 (Democrat
Senator Jack Reed reciting actions of U.S. troops and equating them to violations of Geneva
Convention); Wayne Washington & Bryan Bender, Lawmakers View Images of Abuse, Express
Shock Some Urge Photos Be Made Public, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2004, at Al (Democrat
Representative Martin T. Meehan stating that "[t]here's no doubt in my mind that the abuses at
Abu Ghraib constitute torture").
8. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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treatment of prison inmates, and without clearly intending to do so,
override some of the protections this carefully negotiated and
internationally accepted treaty provides to prisoners of war. While it might
be inconceivable for Congress to "accidentally" do away with some of the
protections afforded by the Geneva Convention, this is not the case. 9 The
later-in-time rule-where a treaty and statute conflict, the one enacted most
recently in time prevails-would enable a court to override the Geneva
Convention if Congress enacted legislation that conflicted with the treaty,
even if Congress did not intend for the legislation to reach that far.
Since 1884, the Supreme Court has recognized the "later-in-time"
rule, which grants trump power to whichever of a statute or a treaty has
most recently been enacted.' 0 Courts are encouraged to first attempt to
construe the statute and treaty in such a way as to avoid a conflict between
them.1 However, when the court cannot reconcile the statute and treaty,
the later-in-time statute will trump the treaty.
2
Before addressing why a treaty-trump rule comports more closely with
the text of the constitution than the later-in-time rule, it is important to
understand the major canons of treaty interpretation. The Supreme Court
has outlined three basic interpretive canons when dealing with treaties: (1)
the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes; (2) the
Charming Betsy presumption; and (3) the later-in-time rule.
One additional important concept is that of legal dualism.' 3 Under this
legal conceptualization, two distinct spheres of law act upon the United
9. It may be useful to understand the extent of the problem. Overall, the United States has
been a party to some 13,000+ treaties. See Oceana Publications Online Titles,
http://www.oceanalaw.com/gateway/main-catalog.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2007). Since 1975
alone, the Senate has received over 700 treaties for ratification. See Treaty Search Page,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.htm (click on the "Search" button under the Congress
section while highlighting "All Congresses") (last visited Apr. 27, 2007). On the other hand,
Congress has already sent the President 37 bills in the 110th session (2006-2007), and sent 581
bills to the President in the 109th session (2005-2006), 589 bills to the President in the 108th
session (2003-2004), and 472 bills to the President in the 107th session (2001-2002). Search
Multiple Congresses, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/multicongress/multicongress.html (check the
appropriate session of Congress, choose "Enrolled Bills Sent to President" and "Both House and
Senate" prior to clicking "Search") (last visited Apr. 27, 2007). In fact, since 1990 alone
Congress has passed over 2000 pieces of legislation. Id. It is not unfathomable for there to be an
unanticipated conflict in such circumstances.
10. Edye v. Roberston, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
11. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), superceded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
12. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (called the
Charming Betsy presumption).
13. See, e.g., Boleslaw A. Boczek, International Law: a dictionary 6 (2005) (explaining the
difference between monism and dualism).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
States: foreign obligations and domestic statutes. 14 Under this view of the
law, U.S. courts apply domestic law unless a treaty is self-executing and
confers a private right of action on citizens. 15 As such, Congress could
pass a new statute that specifically disavows a treaty and U.S. courts would
be bound to apply the new law under the later-in-time rule. However,
enactment of the new law would not, by itself, release the United States
from its obligation under the treaty and the Government would still be
liable for any damages caused by breaching the treaty. 16 The treaty itself is
not repudiated and voided, instead it remains in effect and enforceable
against the United States despite the statutes preemptive power. 17
A. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
For almost one-hundred years, the Court has required that acts of
Congress be presumed to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the
United States.' 8  This presumption, against the extraterritorial reach of
congressional legislation, can be overcome only when Congress uses clear
language to indicate its intent to exercise its extraterritorial power. 19 The
canon "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord., 20 This
presumption effects two different classes of treaties: (1) only extraterritorial
effects and (2) effects targeted within the United States. 2' The first class of
treaties are partially insulated from accidental encroachment by
congressional statutes because Congress must first demonstrate intent for
the law to apply extraterritorially.22  However, once Congress has
14. See id.
15. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 Cornell L.
Rev. 892, 917-27 (2004).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 115(l)(b), 321 (1987).
17. Id.
18. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248; Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,437 (1932).
19. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285. But see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993) (failing to apply the presumption to the Sherman Antitrust Act arguing that prior precedent
had not required Congress to do so under Sherman and the Court would not disrupt precedent).
20. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 248.
21. An example of a primarily extraterritorial treaty would be the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 8. An example of a treaty whose
effects are primarily felt within the United States would be the Migratory Birds Protection
Agreement, U.S.-Can., Jan. 30, 1979, S. EXEC. DOC. W, 96-2 (1980). See also 16 U.S.C. § 712
(implementation domestically of the various bilateral migratory bird treaties entered into by the
United States).
22. See Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 224.
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expressed a clear preference to act extraterritorially, the presumption fails
to protect against congressional actions that might accidentally abrogate a
treaty responsibility. As to the second class of treaties, this canon of
interpretation offers no protection against accidental congressional
abrogation of a treaty.23
B. The Charming Betsy Presumption
The second major canon of statutory interpretation for interpreting
statutes with potential ramification on treaties is to narrowly construe
statutes so as to avoid a potential conflict with existing treaties.24 Arising
from an 1804 case, the presumption originally required that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains. 25  The more modem version of the
presumption is: "Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be
construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an
international agreement of the United States. 26 Thus, the canon is only
employed when a statute is ambiguous-when one potential interpretation
of the statute conflicts with the treaty and the other potential interpretation
avoids the conflict. 27 Moreover, the canon is not merely a restatement of
the presumption against extraterritoriality.28 Instead the canon serves as an
alternative method for courts to limit the reach of congressional statutes
only once the presumption against extraterritoriality has been overcome.29
At its core, the Charming Betsy presumption is an attempt to avoid
violations of international law.30 This presumption affects both domestic
and extraterritorially applicable treaties in the same way: statutes become
penultimate to treaties where multiple interpretations of a statute exist and
23. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (1982), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176
(1982) (failing to discuss the presumption against extraterritoriality because the actions of the
Japanese company were occurring on American soil).
24. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
25. Id.
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114
(1987).
27. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 485 (1998).
28. Id.
29. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-16 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining canon should be used to limit the reach of statutes when "the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been overcome or is otherwise inapplicable"); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839-40 (9th Cir.
1994); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Ar., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
30. Bradley, supra note 27, at 491.
one possible interpretation avoids a direct conflict with a treaty. 3' Thus,
given an ambiguous statute, the Charming Betsy presumption prevents
Congress from accidentally overriding a treaty. However, where a statute's
language is unambiguous, Congress may nevertheless accidentally
supersede a treaty provision without intending to do so.
32
C. The Later-in-time Rule
The third major canon of interpretation utilized by the courts, is the
later-in-time rule. The Supreme Court affirmed the role of the later-in-time
rule in 187133 and officially recognized it as such in 1884.34 However, the
first explanation and use of the rule came from a lower court decision in
1855.35 Facing the question with no controlling precedent, the court asked:
if a "treaty is in conflict with [an] act [of Congress], does the former or the
latter give the rule of decision.., in a case to which one rule or the other
must be applied?, 36  Conveniently, Supreme Court Associate Justice
Benjamin Curtis presided over the Taylor case in his capacity as a circuit
justice.37 Curtis listed several reasons for determining that the latest
expression of the sovereign should control: (1) neither statutes nor treaties
were given priority by the Supremacy Clause; (2) legislatures were free to
override earlier statutes with later statutes and thus they could overrule an
earlier treaty with a later statute; and (3) Congress could nullify a treaty
through a declaration of war and thus Congress must possess the power to
override any treaty through any form of legislation.38
When the Supreme Court later established the later-in-time rule for all
federal courts, it did so using the same rationale as Justice Curtis did in
31. This canon functions in very much the same way that canon of avoidance works with
respect to ambiguous statutes that might conflict with the Constitution itself. See, e.g., DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("Where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems" courts
must construe the statute to avoid such problems "unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress.").
32. See Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (1982), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176
(1982) (failing to discuss the Charming Betsy presumption because there was no ambiguity in
Title VII).
33. In re Clinton Bridge, 5 F. Cas. 1060, 1062 (C.C. Iowa 1867) (No. 2,900), affd, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 454 (1872).
34. Edye v. Roberston, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
35. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), affd, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 481 (1862).
36. Id. at 785.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 785-87.
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Taylor.39 The Court did add, however, that since a statute involves all three
branches of the government, whereas a treaty involves only the President
and Senate, it would seem that priority should be given to "an act in which
all three of the bodies participate. 40  Reaffirming the rule in 1904, the
Supreme Court pithily stated that where there exists "a conflict between an
act of Congress and a treaty.. . the one last in date must prevail. 'AI Since
this pronouncement, no court or dissenting opinion has challenged the
later-in-time rule. However, academics have challenged not only the
constitutional underpinnings relied on by Judge Curtis but the whole of the
rule as well.
42
III. The Constitutional Underpinnings for a
Treaty-trump Rule of Statutory Interpretation
The most prominent underlying basis for the later-in-time rule is that
statutes and treaties have equal authority under the Constitution.
43
However, such a reading of the Constitution is too simplistic and ignores
the significantly different treatment the Constitution gives to statutes and
treaties. A cursory review of the plain text of the Constitution, historical
analysis of the intention of the Framers, and an in-depth examination of the
inter-textual aspects of the Constitution demonstrate that treaties and
statutes were designed to be different. While the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause gives treaties and statutes equal authority with respect to state law,
the Supremacy Clause is silent with respect to their authority relative to one
another.44 The rest of the Constitution, however, indicates that when in
conflict, a treaty should take precedence where Congress has not explicitly
sought to repeal the treaty. The discussion below does not challenge the
constitutionality of the later-in-time rule, instead it is meant to suggest that
39. See Edye, 112 U.S. at 598-99. Since Curtis resigned from the Court in 1857, he did not
take part in the Edye decision, which was handed down in 1884. See, e.g., THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 472 (Chistopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
40. Edye, 112 U.S. at 599.
41. Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 324 (1904).
42. See Pitman B. Potter, Relative Authority of International Law and National Law in the
United States, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 315 (1925) (arguing that the rule is "unsound"); see also
Howard Tolley, Jr., The Domestic Applicability of International Treaties in the United States: A
"Treaty Priority" Alternative to the "Last-in-Time" Rule, 17 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 403 (1983)
(supporting an "alternative norm of [c]onstitutional law, a principle of treaty priority").
43. See, e.g., Edye, 112 U.S. at 599 ("The [C]onstitution gives [a treaty] no superiority over
an act of [C]ongress ... which may be repealed or modified by an act of a later date.").
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
the logical basis for the century-old rule lacks support in the Constitution
itself.
45
A. Textual Analysis Demonstrates That Allowing a Later-in-time
Statute to Trump a Treaty Is Contrary to the Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause commands that "[t]his Constitution, and the
laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the land. 4 6 Neither a treaty 47 nor a
statute48 may trump the Constitution. Moreover, both statutes and treaties
trump state law.49  But, the Supremacy Clause does not affirmatively
determine the relative priorities of a treaty and a statute where they conflict.
Simply because they are given equal status with respect to the Constitution
and state laws does not mean that they are given equal status with respect
to each other. Put a different way, knowing that x (statutes) and y (treaties)
are both less than one-hundred (power of the Constitution) and are both
greater than twenty (power of state laws and Constitutions), tells us nothing
about the relative values of x or y. It is possible that x = 40 and y = 60 or
that x = 50 and y = 30. The Supremacy Clause itself fails to fully define
the relative priorities of statutes and treaties. Thus, their relative
importance must be determined from other aspects of the Constitution.
The Constitution gives significantly different status to statutes and
treaties. Congress may create statutes pursuant to its Article I legislative
power.5° On the other hand, the President possesses the ability, pursuant to
Article II, to enter into treaties as part of his executive power.5 1 Another
difference between statutes and treaties appears within the Supremacy
Clause itself. Article VI treats statutes and treaties differently by listing
45. Anthony C. Infanti, Curtailing Tax Treaty Overrides: A Call to Action, 62 U. PITT. L.
REv. 677, 691 (2001). Professor Infanti offers an interesting analysis of the "later-in-time" rule
and argues that it is patently unconstitutional itself when applied to statutes trumping treaties. Id.
at 678. He draws a parallel to congressional authority with respect to legislative overrides. Id;
see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Professor Infanti argues that because
Congress cannot reserve itself the power to override an action taken by the President, Congress
may also not override a treaty which is essentially the act of the President.
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. See, e.g., Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 225 (1872) ("The treaty power cannot usurp
legislative power or interrupt and prevent the performance of duties imposed by the latter power
on officers whose offices are established by law. Each power must move in its own orbit.").
48. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) ("An act of [C]ongress
repugnant to the [C]onstitution cannot become a law.").
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7-8.
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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them in different phrases and using different language to describe their
effects.52 For example, statutes must be made pursuant to the Constitution,
but it is the full authority of the United States that creates the basis of
power for treaties.53 A third textual difference between statutes and treaties
is that Article I limits Congress' authority to create statutes, 54 while treaties
may have effects that extend beyond those powers specifically enumerated
as belonging to Congress.55
These distinct textual differences poke holes in the Supreme Court's
logic in Edye that "the [C]onstitution gives [a treaty] no superiority over an
act of [C]ongress... which may be repealed or modified by an act of a
later date.",56 The Court's rationale makes two assumptions, both of which
are demonstrably false. First, the Court's pronouncement assumes that just
because treaties and statutes are given equal status with respect to state law
and the Constitution itself, they are equivalent in all other respects.
Second, the Court assumes that treaties are equivalent to an act of
Congress.
The Court's first assumption cannot be squared with the actual text of
the Constitution. The text of the Constitution reveals that other than the
Supremacy Clause, statutes and treaties are different.57 Professor Yoo, one
of the preeminent constitutional and foreign affairs scholars in the nation,
notes that all too often academics incorrectly believe that statutes and
treaties are completely interchangeable.58 To assume they are similar in all
other respects ignores the plain text of the Constitution. Not only do
statutes and treaties derive their enactment power from different branches
52. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
53. Id.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 296 (James Madison)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite.").
55. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920) (holding that a treaty may be
valid even it extends beyond the power the government would have if acting solely under Article
1); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (holding power
exercised extraterritorially is not limited by the enumerated grants of power to Congress).
56. Edye v. Roberston, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
57. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-
Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REv. 757, 761 (2001) (noting that there are "severe textual
and structural problems with eliding statutes and treaties").
58. See id. Professor Yoo, in arguing for the constitutionality of the congressional-executive
agreement, stated that academics are "too willingly embrace complete interchangeability"
between statutes and treaties on one extreme and the complete repudiation of congressional-
executive agreements on the other. Id. Professor Yoo also notes that the founding fathers were
not concerned "about whether statutes could do the job of treaties," but instead concerned
themselves with "whether treaties might invade the province of statutes." Id. at 769
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of government, but the extent of their power and reach within the
federalism structure are considerably different.
5 9
The second assumption the Court makes, that treaties can be thought
of as acts of Congress, serves as the lynchpin in the Court's later-in-time
rationale. The assumption is textually false. It is abundantly clear that
treaties are not acts of Congress. 60 First, the Constitution lists treaties
61among the powers of the Executive, only requiring ratification by one
chamber of Congress, the Senate. 62  Second, where a single chamber of
Congress acts independently of the other, its actions cannot be considered
an expression of the will of Congress.63 For example, in INS v. Chaha, the
Court struck down the concept of the legislative veto because it failed to
64follow the constitutional requirement of bicameralism and presentment.
The legislative veto, in Chadha gave each chamber of Congress the ability
to independently override the determination of the executive branch with
respect to the deportability of an illegal immigrant.65 The Court held that
Congress may only act legislatively through bicameralism. 66 In the treaty
context, because only a single chamber of Congress is involved in the
ratification process, a treaty cannot be considered a legislative act of
Congress. 67  Thus, the later-in-time rule with respect to statutes makes
sense because a subsequent legislative act of Congress, a statute, may
overturn an earlier legislative act of Congress, since both are of the same
type of congressional activity. But, the Court's assumption in Edye that a
treaty is an act of Congress on par with statutory actions is simply false
because a statute is a legislative act of Congress but treaty ratification,
59. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7-8 (granting power to Congress to enact statutes) and
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (limiting Congress's statute making
ability to those powers enumerated in the Constitution) with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(granting power to the President to enact treaties) and Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432-34 (extending
the reach of treaties beyond those powers granted to Congress).
60. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) ("The treaty power does not literally
authorize Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing the President, not
Congress, to make [t]reaties." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
61. See John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 192 (2001).
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
63. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-58 (1983) (holding the legislative veto
unconstitutional because, inter alia, a single chamber of Congress was attempting to legislate to
overturn an executive decision).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (noting that not all acts of Congress require bicameralism and presentment, just
those that are legislative in nature).
67. See id
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which does not involve both chambers, is not.
The bicameralism argument leads to another textual difference
indicating why the later-in-time rule makes sense with respect to
conflicting statutes but not when a treaty is involved. Alexander Hamilton
noted that later-in-time rule should be employed to decide "between the
interfering acts of an EQUAL authority .... ,,68 Thus, the first question
asked when determining whether to apply the later-in-time rule must be
whether the interfering acts have equal authority. As discussed above, the
Supremacy Clause is silent with respect to relative authority of statutes and
treaties. Thus, one must look at the Constitution to determine whether
statutes and treaties are of equal authority.
Under the Constitution, a congressional act becomes law in one of
three ways: (1) a majority of each chamber and the signature of the
President, (2) a majority of each chamber and ten days (excluding Sundays)
pass without a presidential signature while Congress is still in session, or
(3) a two-third majority in each chamber following a presidential veto.69
Each of these three ways is discussed using the same language and in the
same clause within Article I, Section 7.7 0 The first and second methods are
identical according to the Constitution. The language of Article I, Section
7 states that if the President does not return the bill to the Congress within
ten days, then it "shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it.
71
The third method, overriding the veto, is also given identical authority
based on the Constitution's language. The Constitution states that a bill,
"before it become a law,"72 must be approved of by the President. Failing
that, however, if Congress overrides the veto then it "shall become a
Law. 7 3 The parallel language in the use of the phrase "become a law,"
indicates that this method is also of equal authority. Thus, each of the three
methods of legislative enactment are all treated equally under the
Constitution, and it makes sense to have later passed laws supersede earlier
passed laws under Hamilton's viewpoint.74
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 54, at 439. The basic idea of
the "later-in-time" rule is that the latest expression of the sovereign should rule only when the
latest expression has the same magnitude of effect as the former expression of the sovereign. Id.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
70. Id. (indicating that once the legislation is signed by the President it will "become a law,"
and if it is not signed within ten days while Congress is still in session then the legislation "shall
be a Law," and if the veto is overridden by two-thirds of each chamber of Congress then it "shall
become a Law").
71. Id. (emphasis added)
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The "later-in-time" rule for statutory interpretation expresses the belief that one body
Treaties, however, are not "equal" with respect to a statute in terms of
how it is passed or the difficulty with which it is ratified. As a threshold
matter, even though a treaty has the full effect of a law, it cannot be
considered a law where that word refers to the legislative authority-
Article I power--of the United States.75 A treaty only takes effect once
ratified, which requires both the President submitting it to the Senate and
the Senate voting in favor of the treaty by a two-thirds majority. 76 Using
Hamilton's equality test, if a subsequent statute may override a treaty this
would be tantamount to recognizing that the treaty ratification process and
statute enactment process are equal. In effect, this would be the equivalent
of stating that a treaty's ratification could be made by a majority of each
chamber plus the signature of the President or with two-thirds of each
chamber voting after a presidential veto.77 Yet, this is clearly contrary to
the explicit Constitutional pronouncement that treaties may only be ratified
in one way: when the President submits it to the Senate for approval and
the treaty receives two-thirds of the Senate vote. 78 Thus, the later-in-time
rule, which makes sense in the context of conflicting statutes, cannot be
used in a textually consistent way when it is a treaty that conflicts with a
statute.
Moreover, the later-in-time rule only applies when the latest
expression has the same magnitude of authority as the former expression of
the sovereign. 79 Yet, statutes and treaties are not of the same constitutional
magnitude, as just discussed. Thus, the mere invocation of the later-in-time
canon forces a court to determine which expression of the sovereign is
stronger: the Executive or Legislative. The Court has previously noted that
when acts of different branches of the government are in conflict, a
different rule of interpretation ought to be followed, which takes into
consideration prevailing policy considerations at the time.8°
may not control later actions of the same body. See Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the
Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 197-200 (1986)
(discussing the origins of the "later-in-time" rule for conflicting statutes).
75. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) ("The treaty power does not literally
authorize Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing the President, not
Congress, 'to make [t]reaties."'); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty
Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEo. L.J. 1885, 1894-95 (2005) (commenting on
the implications of Lara and noting that once the Senate ratifies a treaty it takes effect even
without implementing legislation under Article I).
76. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
77. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7.
78. See U.S. CONST. art 11, § 2, cl. 2.
79. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 54, at 439 (discussing
the later in time rule with respect to multiple conflicting statutes).
80. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
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While the Constitution does speak to the relative priority of statutes
and treaties vis-&-vis the Constitution itself, the Constitution does not
directly address the relative authority of statutes and treaties with respect to
each other.8' The Court has tangentially discussed the relative weights of
treaties and statutes in the past. Consider that the treaty itself, and not any
formal resolutions made by the Senate, is supreme.82 Similarly, the treaty
that is supreme under the Supremacy Clause not the laws that are made in
pursuance thereof.83 A perfect hypothetical to test the relative priority of
treaties and statutes would be the following: Both Houses pass a bill,
which purports to be an interpretation of an existing treaty; the President
vetoes then bill; and the House and Senate successfully override the veto.
Which law is supreme, the treaty itself or the later-in-time expression of the
Congress? The Court has already addressed a similar circumstance in
Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States.84  There, the Court held that
courts should ignore the later-in-time expression of Congress and instead
interpret the treaty as if the act of Congress had not occurred.85 Thus,
concurring) (discussing how the President's authority to act should be divided into three
situations: where Congress concurs, where Congress is silent, and where Congress disagrees. The
extent of presidential power is determined by which situation is at hand and what the policy
considerations are). Part IV of this paper will further explore how a "treaty-trump" rule, in the
absence of congressional intent to override a treaty, makes more sense than the "last-in-time" rule
on policy grounds.
81. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
82. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 180 (1901) (stating that a
resolution by the Senate passed with less than two-thirds support was "absolutely without legal
significance" and that whatever view the House might take of a treaty was immaterial); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326, reporters'
n. 1 (1987) (ruling out any subsequent Senate action even if passed with more than two-thirds of
those present); Moore, supra note 61, at 185.
83. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]I1 Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land."); see also Moore, supra
note 61, at 193 ("That is, it is the treaty which is the supreme law of the land, not domestic
conditions attached to treaties or a separate domestic interpretation of the Senate apart from the
treaty.").
84. 183 U.S. at 180
85. Id. ("The meaning of the treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some
of those who may have voted to ratify it."). There are distinct differences between this
hypothetical and the actual implementation of the "later-in-time" rule. For one, the Act of
Congress here might not be considered a "law" because it was not passed pursuant to Congress's
legislative power. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (describing how use of
legislative power requires an "action that ha[s] the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties and relations of persons ... all outside the Legislative Branch."). On the other hand, it is
possible that this action by Congress would be considered "legislative" since it seeks to affect the
legal rights or duties of those presumably affected by a different interpretation of the treaty. A
separate distinction between the hypothetical and traditional use of the "later-in-time" rule is that
in the hypothetical the action by Congress was meant to tell the courts how to do their job in
interpreting the treaty whereas a typical "later-in-time" case involves an act of Congress without
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outside the context of later-in-time rule, the Court has indicated that treaties
are slightly more controlling than a later-in-time expression of certain sorts:
such as statutes that either interpret or implement treaties. However,
despite the internal inconsistency within the Court's decisions, the later-in-
time rule continues to be utilized as such.
Overall, from a textual perspective, the Constitution seems to disfavor
overriding a treaty with a later-in-time statute. First, the underlying
rationale of the seminal Supreme Court case with respect to using the later-
in-time rule is demonstrably contrary to the Constitution. Second, treaties
and statutes are not an "equal" expression of the sovereign as required
before the later-in-time rule can even be applied. Treaties are
constitutionally distinct from statutes, which further undermines the
rationale for using the later-in-time rule where they conflict. Finally, the
Court has demonstrated that where a later-in-time statute is meant to
interpret or implement a treaty, the actually treaty is controlling and not the
more recent expression of the sovereign.
B. The Original Intent of the Framers Was to Ensure the
Preeminence of the Treaty Absent a Clear Expression from
Congress to the Contrary.
The Framers knew that treaties and statutes were entirely different
beasts. Their writings demonstrate that statutes should not be able to
overrule the treaty-making authority of the Executive Branch. Under the
Articles of Confederation, the treaty making authority was vested in the
same body responsible for legislation, the Congress of the United States.
86
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention knew that they had to alter
the treaty-making authority of the new government and sought to maintain
the distinction between treaty making and legislation so prominent in the
British system.87 The Federalist Papers helped to capture the sentiments of
those seeking ratification by expounding upon the nature of the treaty
power as a hybrid between the power of the Executive and Legislative
branches:
The power of making treaties is, plainly, neither the one nor the
other. It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting laws,
regard for the treaty itself. One final distinction is that in the hypothetical it is clear that Congress
is attempting to alter the treaty explicitly whereas a typical "later-in-time" case lacks the explicit
statement from Congress as to its intent. Nonetheless, the hypothetical serves to demonstrate that
tangentially, at least, the Supreme Court seems to be acknowledging that in certain circumstances
a "later-in-time" expression of the sovereign will not be controlling.
86. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1778).
87. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 2024 (1999).
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nor to the enacting of new ones .... Its objects are
CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the force of law,
but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not
rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements
between sovereign and sovereign. The power in question seems
therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, properly,
neither to the Legislative nor to the Executive.
88
John Jay even wrote that "[t]hey who make laws may, without doubt,
amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they who make
treaties may alter or cancel them. ' 9  Jay's comment demonstrates two
important understandings of the Framers. First, that different groups of
people had the ability to make laws and statutes. And second, that only the
same group of people that enacted a statute could override the statute.
Similarly a different group of people had the authority to ratify treaties and
to alter and cancel them. Jay's writing recognizes the difference between
the two powers. In restructuring the government the Framers determined
that treaties would be placed in the province of the Executive with
consultation from the states (in the form of Senators). The people (in the
form of the House) had no say in the treaty making process.
Yet, leaving the House out of the treaty making process worried the
Anti-federalists. 90 They sought to defeat the Constitution's ratification, in
part because they feared the Executive could trample individual rights in
the absence of House intervention. 91 In response to the Anti-federalist
campaign, the Federalists noted that without the House's participation
treaties would not be successfully integrated into domestic law.
92
Essentially, the Federalist argued that treaties with the potential to impact
private citizens lives-those with domestic effect-needn't worry the
ratifiers of the Constitution because the House would protect citizens
through denial of implementing legislation. The converse side of the
Federalist argument presumed that for treaties that didn't implicate citizens
lives-those with strictly extraterritorial effect-no action by the House
88. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 54, at 425.
89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay), supra note 54, at 379.
90. Yoo, supra note 87, at 2025.
91. Id. The anti-federalists feared that only the House could protect the citizens because
only the House was responsive directly to the people. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. At the time
the state legislators chose the Senators directly. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII, § 1. Because the House played no role in the ratification of treaties, the
anti-federalists were concerned that if the Senate and President could not succeed at trampling
individual rights through the legislative process, they would simply turn to the treaty ratification
process in order to bypass the protections against such encroachment provided by the House.
92. Yoo, supra note 87, at 2025. Essentially the Federalist campaigned on the theory of
legal dualism. See supra notes 13-17.
would be necessary at all. Thus, the belief of the Framers was that the
legislative role in the treaty-making process was confined to treaties that
had domestic effects. If the Framers believed that Congress did not need to
legislate with respect to extraterritorial treaties, it is hard to see how the
Framers would have believed that a subsequent act of Congress would be
permitted to override the treaty. With respect to domestically-applicable
treaties, the sole function of legislation was in implementation. Again,
given the limited role legislation was to play in the post-treaty ratification
process, it seems unrealistic that the Framer's would have then allowed a
subsequent act of Congress to overturn the treaty.
But such conjecture is not necessary. The writings of the Framers
confirm that they prioritized treaties over statutes. Alexander Hamilton
started his description of the treaty power by noting that "[t]he
Constitution... considers the power of treaty as different from that of
legislation., 93 Subsequently Hamilton explained that a later-in-time treaty
must supercede a preexisting statute: "A treaty must necessarily repeal an
antecedent law contrary to it. ' ' 94 Yet, Hamilton indicated the reverse might
not be true since a treaty could "control and bind the legislative power of
Congress." 95 More succinctly he stated: "Though a treaty may effect what
a law can, yet a law cannot effect what a treaty does. 96 If the Framer's
truly believed in Hamilton's words, how could a later-in-time statute
override a treaty?
Overall, the Framers intended that the treaty making authority would
rest in a different branch than the legislative authority. While both sets of
laws-treaty and statute-were to be equally weighed when balanced
against the Constitution, the Framers believed that treaties had significantly
greater power than did statutes. As such, having the default presumption
maintain the prominence of the treaty, even in the face of a later-in-time
statute, would more appropriately comport with the original intent of the
Framers.
93. ALEXANDER HAMILTON & HENRY CABOT LODGE, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 169 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1904).
94. Id. at 174.
95. Id. at 183.
96. Id. at 168. Hamilton's statement here is not meant to say that laws may not supercede a
treaty, only that because treaties are either bi-lateral or multi-lateral a mere act of Congress
cannot alter the terms between the nations. An act of Congress can prevent the United States
from fulfilling a treaty obligation, but that is not the same as physically altering the text of the
treaty. Such an alteration could only come from a new treaty. However, his sentiments are
instructive in that it again demonstrates that as a default, the Framer's believed that treaties were
more powerful than statutes because on its own a treaty could override a statute but the reverse
implication was not true.
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C. A Treaty-trump Presumption Better Harmonizes the Inter-textual
Analysis Than the Later-in-time Rule
The question for the courts is what should the appropriate default rule
be when dealing with a later-in-time statute that trumps a treaty provision.
As has already been shown above, the text of the Constitution and the
Framers favor giving the treaty priority. Favoring a treaty-trump
presumption also comports with the interplay of other sections of the
Constitution like Congress' ability to declare war and the role of Senators
in treaty ratification.
One of Judge Curtis's reasons for determining that the later-in-time
rule should be used when statutes and treaties conflict was that if Congress
declared war97 on a nation with which a treaty existed that act of Congress
would abrogate any existing treaties. 98  Therefore, any act of Congress
should be able to abrogate a treaty.99 As an initial matter, a treaty-trump
presumption would produce the same result. A declaration of war against a
nation is an explicit acknowledgement by Congress that all formal ties
between the nations, including treaties, are severed.'0 0 Thus, using a treaty-
trump presumption would similarly permit Congress to abrogate treaties
through the use of a declaration of war. It is not accidental; it is not later-
in-time; instead it is a thoughtful decision made after considerable debate
that Congress clearly intends to act in a particular way. Therefore, another
one of the underlying rationales for the later-in-time rule would be
subsumed under the treaty-trump rule.
Another aspect of inter-textualism that bears on this issue is the
function of the Senate. When the states initially ratified the Constitution,
Senators were chosen by the state legislature and not through direct
election. 10' Because treaties not only bound the federal government but all
states as well, the Framers wanted to ensure that the states themselves had a
say in which treaties the federal government would enter. Thus, the
Framers chose for the Senate-a body in which all states are equally
represented and in which the voting members were chosen by the states
themselves-to ratify or reject the treaty by supermajority. 10 2 At the time
97. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
98. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), aff'd, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 481 (1862).
99. Id.
100. George Steven Swan, Presidential Undeclared Warmaking and Functionalist Theory:
Dellums v. Bush and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 75, 122
(1991).
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
102. David. M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1098-99 (2000); see also
of the founding, this meant that if more than thirty percent of the states
objected, a treaty could not proceed. 10 3 Yet, if the later-in-time rule were to
be used, then a piece of legislation, not supported by both Senators of any
state, could trump the will of the states. 0 4 This would essentially eliminate
the careful planning that the Framers put into the role of the states in the
legislative process.
One final aspect of inter-textualism that bears noting is that Congress
is given the authority to regulate "commerce with foreign nations."'15 The
fact that this power is specifically enumerated among Congress's Article I
powers demonstrates that the Framers certainly felt that regulation of
commerce with foreign nations was different than the treaty authority.
10 6
Because of this difference, allowing Congress to override a treaty, without
placing additional procedural hurdles in its path, 10 7 would essentially treat
the regulation of foreign commerce power and the treaty-making power on
par with each other. In order to avoid having a part of the Constitution be
redundant, the two powers should be read as distinct and different.
IV. Why a Treaty-trump Rule Makes
Sense from a Policy Perspective.
Yet, even with the Constitution disfavoring use of later-in-time rule to
have a statute trump a treaty, nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress
from explicitly overriding a treaty where it is acting pursuant to any of the
powers granted to it under the Constitution.10 8  Several policy reasons
weigh in favor of using a treaty-trump rule. First, requiring a plain
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
103. The original Constitution applied to only thirteen states and thus twenty-six Senators. A
two-thirds vote required eighteen Senators. Assuming that both Senators from a state voted the
same way on treaty matters then nine states would be required to vote in favor of the treaty. This
would leave four of the thirteen states opposed. Using the same hypotheticals for today (even
though Senators are no longer beholden to the individual states) if thirty-two percent of the states
opposed a treaty could not proceed.
104. Each set of Senators could split their vote such that no two Senators from the same state
voted in favor of the bill.
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
106. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1867,
1881 n.63 (2005) (explaining how the grammatical difference between the treaty authority in
Article II and regulation of foreign commerce in Article I belies any suggestion that the powers
are equivalent).
107. The additional procedural hurdle here is no different than the plain statement rule that
the Supreme Court requires before Congress acts in a traditional realm of state authority. See
discussion infra Part W.A.
108. Indeed, how can the Constitution prevent explicit overrides of treaties where it permits
implicit ones via the "later-in-time" rule.
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statement from Congress to trump a treaty would harmonize how Congress
must similarly use a plain statement when using its domestic power to
encroach on sensitive areas of constitutional importance. Second, a treaty-
trump rule ensures greater stability in international law. Third, a treaty-
trump rule avoids accidental liability that might be incurred by the United
States for violating a treaty provision. And fourth, following a treaty-trump
rule would bring consistency to the scattered Supreme Court decisions in
this area of the law.
A. Analogizing to the Plain Statement Rule
The plain statement rule requires that "if Congress intends to alter the
usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute."' 10 9 Accordingly "federal courts will construe a
statute to alter the federal balance only when Congress expresses an
'affirmative intention' to do so.""i 0 The rationale behind the most recent
recitation of the rule was that when federalism concerns were implicated,
Congress should be prevented from accidentally using its power in a way
that it did not mean for the power to be used.1l The expansion of the plain
statement rule when Congress was legislating under its Commerce Clause
power was meant to "sen[d] a strong message to Congress that [the Court]
takes state sovereignty seriously" and that the Court was becoming
"increasingly hostile to congressional regulation of state governmental
functions, particularly in the area of commerce."'"12 And plain statements
are not new to Congress. Besides the most recent use in the Commerce
Clause context, the Court has previously employed it in the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 3  And even before that, Congress' spending
authority was subject to plain statement rule when Congress attempted to
have a state act in a particular way.14
The plain statement rule essentially forces Congress to "stop and
109. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (internal quotation marks removed).
110. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting DeMarco v. Holy
Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 169 (2d Cir. 1993)).
111. Bruce Dayton Livingston, Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Supreme Court Announces a New
Rule of Statutory Construction in Deference to Constitutionally Recognized Principles of
Federalism, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 243, 243 (1992).
112. Deanna L. Ruddock, Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and Judicial
Supervision of Federal-State Relations, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1563, 1590-91 (1992).
113. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1981).
114. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
585-98 (1937).
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think" before acting in a traditional realm of state authority." 5  In
summary, where Congress is acting outside of its traditional realm and
interfering with the careful balance of power that the Constitution has
created between the federal government and the states, it is required to
make a plain statement. The same logic should apply where Congress is
interfering with the careful balance of power that the Constitution has
created between the Executive branch and the Legislative. 16 To require
Congress to state in its legislation that it intends for the statute to take
precedence over any conflicting treaty would merely force Congress to
"stop and think" before determining that the statute should override a
carefully negotiated international accord.' 17
Requiring Congress to make a plain statement in the Spending Clause
context, 1 8 the Fourteenth Amendment context, 119 and more recently in the
Commerce Clause 120 context has not proved burdensome for Congress.
Requiring them to also make a plain statement where, in its absence
Congress might violate an Executive action, should be equally important
and easy to accomplish.
B. A "Treaty-trump" Rule Would Ensure Greater Stability in
International Agreements.
The sanctity of a treaty is one of the most fundamental aspects of
international law.121 When American courts determine that a later-in-time
statute ought to trump a treaty, they are intending to give effect to the
expression of the latest will of the sovereign but at the same time ignore the
115. This is not to say that the rule is in any way designed to prevent Congress from acting.
Only that it requires Congress to make it clear that they do intend to act in such a way. In some
ways this can be analogized to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which essentially
requires attorney's to stop, think, and investigate before proceeding with a claim. See Patricia M.
Graham, Sanctions Unwarranted by Existing Law, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 609, 623-24 (1986).
116. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
117. See Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1113, 1180 (1997) (noting that plain statement
rules force greater accountability and transparency on Congress).
118. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (holding that Congress can
explicitly require states to act in a particular way via the Spending Clause only if they "do so
unambiguously").
119. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (requiring Congress to make a
"plain statement" of its intent when legislating "in areas traditionally regulated by the States").
120. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (requiring
Congress to make a plain statement before utilizing its Commerce Clause power intrusively
against the states).
121. Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 313, 323 (2001).
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potentially harmful international effects of their decision. 122  One of the
important aspects of treaties is to allow for a stable rule of law upon which
businesses can rely when conducting transactions abroad. 123  In fact,
treaties that help create tariff and non-tariff barriers, in particular, "are an
effective way to establish stability in the United States economy.' 24 Yet,
when Congress legislatively overrides a tax-treaty, for example, it causes
significant harm to the United States. 25 A treaty-trump rule would leave
the status quo in place with respect to international agreements until
Congress explicitly and openly revokes a treaty. 126  Because such a
revocation would have to be explicit, businesses and the international
community (the public at large) could weigh in on the implications of the
new law and provide feedback as to the ultimate impacts on business.
Businesses in general dislike uncertainty and prefer to engage in
activities with minimum risk and maximum certainty of outcomes.
127
When the courts determine that a later-in-time statute should trump a
provision in a treaty, they are essentially changing the underlying legal
system under which business have been operating. When the legal
foundation upon which businesses have been managing expectations shifts
suddenly and significantly, instability is created. 128 While the shift costs
the court nothing, it has a substantial cost to business. 29  In the
international context, this could mean that business investment made on a
good faith belief in a treaty provision could be lost if a later-in-time statue
trumps the treaty in a way that Congress never intended. The advantage of
a treaty-trump presumption is that business would be alerted to potential
122. See supra notes 35,76-77, 81 and accompanying text.
123. Jonathan I. Miller, Prospects for Satisfactory Dispute Resolution of Private Commercial
Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 1313, 1327-28
(1994) ("[T]reaties and international agreements have become the primary source for creating and
enforcing obligations in the international trading field.").
124. Id. at 1328 n.77.
125. Infanti, supra note 45, at 677 (discussing harms to the reputation of the United States
and undermining the trust that treaty partners have placed in the federal government).
126. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 US 244 (1991), superceded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). This case demonstrates the significant contortions of the law a court
is required to make in order to preserve a treaty. Congress had expressed a desire to have its law
apply extra-territorially but the Court instead had to twist the words of the statute to prevent
extraterritorial reach. See id. at 260-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Dudley Cooke, October 2001 Newsletter: The Day the World Changed: Leading Amid
Uncertainty, http://www.libertystrategies.com/newsletters/2001oct.htm (last visited Apr. 27,
2007).
128. Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 689-
90 (1990).
129. Id.
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changes in legal status at a far earlier stage and would be able to make the
appropriate risk analysis calculations.
As an additional benefit to the stability in international accords,
greater transparency would result from a treaty-trump rule. Since Congress
would be required to expressly state that it was attempting to trump
portions of a treaty, it would allow for greater debate on the issues and
protection of international accords. It would also give the President signing
the legislation more knowledge about the potential international
implications of such a statute. Since the Executive branch is the "sole
organ" of foreign affairs, 130 it would be best for the President, when
presented with the appropriate legislation and plain statement from
Congress, to determine the foreign affairs needs of the country, and not to
leave such a determination to the courts.13 Plain statements from Congress
ultimately help increase the transparency of Congress' decision-making,1
32
and consequently serve to increase the accountability of the decision-
makers. 133 As such, a more "robust and meaningful deliberation by the
electorate and their representatives" can take place. 134  Congress may
ultimately decide that it wants to abrogate a provision of a treaty and the
President may agree and sign the legislation. But, if that happens, at least
the business and international community will have been afforded ample
disclosure and a clear knowledge of what the new underlying legal
framework will be. As such, switching to a treaty-trump rule can eliminate
the risk and uncertainty-in the increasingly global business
environment-that are associated with the later-in-time rule.
C. A "Treaty-trump" Would Force Congress to Weigh the Costs and
Benefits of Violating an International Accord.
When a court determines that a later-in-time statute should trump an
existing treaty provision, the United States is still obligated under
international law to comply with the treaty. 135 Under the current later-in-
130. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see also U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the authority to "appoint ambassadors"); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3 (granting the President the authority to "receive ambassadors and other public
ministers").
131. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-50 (1982).
132. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695, 722 (1996).
133. Garrett, supra note 117, at 1180.
134. Id.
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 1 15(l)(b), 321 (1987); see also James A.R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United
States Law of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 46
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time regime, Congress could override a treaty without considering what the
liability for the United States would be or the potential intemational harm
that might result. This very concern is likely what was at the heart of the
Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. 1
36
While no treaty was explicitly at stake in Arabian American Oil, the
majority desperately sought to avoid the extraterritorial reach of Title VII
despite relatively clear language from Congress to the contrary. 137 Imagine
two situations: the first involves the extraterritorial application of Title VII
in a country with whom the United States has a pre-existing treaty
permitting employment on whatever basis the country chooses and
providing tax penalties should the rule be altered; the second involves a
country where no such treaty exists. In order to avoid the conflict under the
later-in-time rule, the court would be required to utilize the twisted logic
present in Arabian American Oil, which led to Congress immediately
reversing the Court. 138 However, under a treaty-trump rule, the law would
apply in the second hypothetical situation but not in the first. Because the
law has extraterritorial reach and because Congress did not make it clear it
wanted to abrogate any treaties with the passage of Title VII, the treaty
would remain in tact in the first hypothetical. This would allow for two
significantly positive effects. First, no penalty would be imposed upon
Congress as would occur under the later-in-time analysis. Second,
Congress could have extraterritorial effect in all nations where a treaty did
not preclude such an enactment exactly as Congress desired. There would
be no need for an all-or-nothing result. Instead, a more finely tuned result
would be achieved.
Congress could simply attach a runner to any statute that stated "this
statute takes precedence over any previously ratified treaty" in order to
overcome the presumption.'3 9 This would suffice as a clear statement that
AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 421, 425 (1998).
136. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), supercededby statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244 (1994).
137. See supra text accompanying note 126.
138. Congress amended Title VII less than a year after the Court handed down its decision.
The amended version extensively rewrote the statute to ensure that the law would have an
extraterritorial application. While the intent of the 1964 Congress, which originally enacted the
law cannot be known for certain, it seems apparent that the Court misconstrued their original.
The original version of Title VII contained an "alien exemption" clause and the EEOC had
consistently interpreted it to apply extraterritorially. It seems likely, however, that the original
Congress did intend for the law to have extraterritorial reach. Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 249.
139. It could be argued that Congress is simply on notice today that it should attach a runner
to all legislation that states "this statute should fail where in conflict with an existing treaty."
Placing the presumption on favoring the treaty, however, allows Congress to make general
Congress was willing to accept whatever fallout occurred from the
trumping effect of the statute. The President would also be put on notice
that signing such legislation could have international ramifications. His
signature on the legislation would indicate that the United States was
willing to bear the cost of any broken treaty.'
40
D. Employing a Treaty-trump Rule Would Settle the Uncertain State
of the Law in this Field.
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has altered the intent
requirements needed before lower courts could employ the later-in-time
rule. In the early 1930s the Supreme Court essentially endorsed the treaty-
trump rule when it required that Congress "clearly express[]" its intent
before it would deem a treaty "to have been abrogated or modified by a
later statute."' 4' However, the Supreme Court never again cited this
holding. Instead in the 1990s the Court reverted back to a less searching
inquiry when employing the later-in-time rule. 42 The Court restated the
rule without the intent requirement at all: "when a statute which is
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of
conflict renders the treaty null."'143 In between, during the 1950s, the Court
categorized the intent requirement as requiring only "some affirmative
expression of congressional intent to abrogate the United States'
international obligations.', 144  In essence, the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on this matter is scattered and inconsistent. 145  Creating a
consistent and clearly defined rule would enable lower courts to more
easily determine outcomes and bring certainty to the law.
146
changes to the status quo and exclude those changes in specific circumstances. Allowing
Congress to state the statue would fail where conflicting with a prior treaty it essentially restricts
Congress ability to alter the status quo in the general case.
140. In essence this requirement ensures that Congress has in fact "stopped" and "thought"
and "considered" what it was doing and the ramifications of the action. See text accompanying
notes 115, 117.
141. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) ("A treaty will not be deemed to have
been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has
been clearly expressed.").
142. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam) (holding that the AEDPA
trumped the Vienna convention despite the lack of findings on the part of Congress).
143. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion).
144. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
145. See Bradley, supra note 27, at 491 n.64.
146. Cf George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S. C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the Obvious
Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 437, 473 (1999) (discussing how the
Supreme Court's inconsistent holdings with respect to patent validity "provided little stability and
guidance to the lower courts").
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V. A Treaty-trump Rule More Accurately
Reflects Modern Day Court Practice.
Shifting to a treaty-trump rule would not cause much difficulty for
either Congress or the lower courts because it more closely resembles what
the lower courts actually do today. 147  As discussed in Part II, prior to
employing the later-in-time rule, lower courts are first required to construe
the statute as not applying extraterritorially and then to avoid a conflict
with customary international law if at all possible. 1
48
The Charming Betsy presumption prevents Congress from violating
"customary international law" without first making a plain statement of its
intent to do SO.149  While not all treaties are considered "customary
international law,"'15 this first presumption helps limit the application of
the later-in-time rule. In essence, Court requires that Congress explicitly
overrule customary international law, but allows for accidental overruling
of a treaty! This creates the perverse circumstance in which the United
States is more bound by laws that it hasn't necessarily passed,' 51 than by
the treaties that are ratified by two-third of the Senate and signed by the
President.' 52  For example, in United States v. Palestine Liberation
Organization the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York applied the Charming Betsy presumption even though the a
later-in-time anti-terrorism statute seemed to abrogate the United States
obligation to the United Nations.' 53  The district court even noted that
"Congress has the power to enact statutes abrogating prior treaties or
international obligations entered into by the United States" and nonetheless
applied the Charming Betsy presumption to save the treaty.'
54
The second presumption that courts employ is the presumption against
extraterritoriality.155 Again, while not all treaties have an extraterritorial
147. See Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 231-232 (1993) (explaining how the Court uses the two canons to avoid
"international complications by leaving such matters to Congress").
148. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
149. See discussion supra Part II.B.
150. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary
International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71, 79 (1996) (noting that "if there are few
bilateral treaties covering a particular subject," they might not produce strong enough evidence
that a customary international law has been formed).
151. Customary international law is part of American law. United States v. Spanish Smack
Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903).
152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
153. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
154. Id.
155. See discussion supra Part II.A.
effect, this presumption helps limit the later-in-time rule by ratcheting up
the level of congressional findings needed before a court will override a
treaty that has extraterritorial effects. For example, in Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Nahas the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals avoided application of the later-in-time rule by construing the
legislation to not apply extraterritorially. 5 6 The D.C. Circuit noted that the
lower court should have followed the rule of statutory construction that
creates the presumption that Congress does not intend its law to apply
extraterritorially. 1
57
The problem with relying on these two canons of interpretation to help
prevent all later-in-time statutes from trumping treaties in the absense of a
plain statement from Congress, is that not all treaties have extraterritorial
application or involve the violation of customary international law. This
situation was squarely presented in the Second Circuits decision in
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc v. Avigliano.158 In Sumitomo, Title VII came
into conflict with the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and Japan (the "Japanese Treaty").159 The issue
was whether a New York based wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese
corporation was subject to Title VII's anti-discrimination provisions when
the Japanese Treaty itself permitted management to hire personnel of their
own choosing.' 60 Neither of the above-discussed canons was applicable
since the law applied domestically and customary international law does
not speak to employment hiring practices. If the court gave affect to the
treaty, then the subsidiary would be forced to comply with Title VII while a
branch office in the exact same building would not.16 1 To avoid that
conflict, the Second Circuit determined that the treaty should be applicable
to both branches and subsidiaries despite the fact that the later-in-time rule
would have resulted in the reverse effect. 162 The Supreme Court reversed
but avoided application of the later-in-time rule and permitted the very
inconsistency about which the Second Circuit worried. 16 3 The Court found
that because the wholly-owned subsidiary was an American company it
156. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
157. Id. at 493.
158. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176
(1982).
159. Id. at 553.
160. Id. at 555.
161. Id. at 556.
162. Id. at 555-56.
163. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982).
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was not subject to the treaty at all.' 64
Because many of the lower courts do attempt to avoid use of the later-
in-time rule by employing the above canons, 165 altering the presumption to
be one of treaty-trump would not be a significant burden for the courts
today. With respect to Congress, the change in presumption will also mean
very little. In the cases where Congress clearly intended for the legislation
to override an existing treaty the result will be the same. The only
difference will be in cases where the statute was not clear about whether it
should trump the treaty. In such circumstances the courts will use the
presumption to leave the treaty in tact and essentially force Congress to go
back, and make the specific findings and engage in the open debate before
reversing the Court. While legislating is not cost free, the error-cost seems
to be better placed on Congress instead of the Executive. The cost of
creating a new piece of legislation requiring the House, Senate and
President to agree seems far less than the cost of creating a new treaty
involving not only the President and a supermajority of the Senate, but a
foreign country as well. Given the difference in error cost it seems
reasonable to place the extra cost on Congress in situations where Congress
has not acted in a clear and explicit way.
VI. Conclusion
The later-in-time rule has been a canon of statutory interpretation for
over 120 years. Yet, when applied in the context of a later-in-time statute
trumping an existing treaty, the canon seems to lack a constitutional basis.
The principles underlying the later-in-time rule are significantly eroded
when an act of the Executive branch conflicts with a later act of the
legislative branch. Instead, the Constitution, the Framers, and general
policy all favor a treaty-trump rule in the absence of a plain statement from
Congress that the newly enacted law ought to trump an existing treaty.
A treaty-trump rule would ensure greater stability in the international
realm-helping American businesses appropriately undertake risk
assessment-and will allow for greater transparency and accountability
domestically. Moreover, a treaty-trump rule would produce a better result
with respect to the error-costs associated with a court decision that did not
reflect the actual will of Congress. Finally, a treaty-trump rule is more
soundly ground in the Constitution itself: first, both treaties and statutes
remain inferior to the Constitution; second, it helps clarify the relative
164. Id. at 182-83.
165. Turley, supra note 147, at 227 n.216 (collecting cases where courts have avoided
application of the "later-in-time" rule).
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weight of treaties and statutes to each other given the text of the
Constitution; and finally, the original intent of the Framers to make treaties
more powerful than statutes is given effect.
